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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
The Prisoner's Right to Hear Mass
In the recent case of McBride v. McCorkie, 1 a New Jersey court held, inter alia,
that a prisoner being kept in a disciplinary
segregation wing of the state prison because
of bad conduct can be denied attendance
at Mass celebrated in the prison chapel on
Sundays and Holy Days of Obligation without violating his right of freedom of religion
guaranteed by the state and Federal Constitutions.
This is the only reported case found in
which a prisoner has brought suit for the
deprivation of his religious rights under
the United States Constitution. The court,
quite properly, assumed that convicts are
within the protection afforded by the guarantees of the first amendment to the Federal Constitution. The wording of the
fourteenth amendment, which makes the
first amendment's guarantees applicable to
the states,2 clearly would not allow any
other construction: ". . . [N]or shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law....
The Constitution of New Jersey is equally
explicit: "No person shall be deprived of
the inestimable privilege of worshipping
Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the
4
dictates of his own conscience ....
In addition, courts have explicitly recognized that a prisoner does not lose all of
144 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957). The
court carefully distinguishes segregation from
solitary confinement, the former being a milder
and less severe form of punishment than the
latter. 130 A.2d at 882-83.
2 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (emphasis added).
4 N.J. CONST. art. 1, §3 (emphasis added).

his constitutional rights by virtue of his
conviction. In Coffin v. Reichard5 it was
said: "A prisoner retains all the rights
of an ordinary citizen, except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law."' 6
It is apparent, however, that, even
though a convict retains many 'of his constitutional rights, the state will be able to
exert greater control over the exercise of
those rights than it would over the rights
of a free person. The very nature of imprisonment and the status of a convict force
this conclusion. An analogous result was
reached in Prince v. Massachusetts7 where
the Supreme Court held that children have
a status different from adults and are therefore subject to a greater measure of state
authority than are their parents.
The right of religious'freedom has a twofold nature, encompassing freedom to believe and freedom to exercise that belief."
The former may never be interfered with
by the state. 9 The latter may be limited
only when the limitation placed upon the
exercise is necessary for the protection of
a substantial'0 interest of society which
society has a right to protect." The subcert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945).
6 Coffin v. Reichard, supra note 5, at 445. See
also White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall ) 646- 651
(1872); Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. upp.
906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
7321 U.S. 158 (1944).
8 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
) Id. at 303-04.
10 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
508-09 (1951).
11 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 8, at
303-04.
5 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944),

4
stantial interests of society defy any comprehensive listing, but generally fall into
the areas of public health,'1 2 peace and
safety,' 3 and morals. 14 In the area of freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment,
which sometimes have been said to enjoy
a "preferred status"" 5 under the Constitution, limitations placed on the exercise of
constitutional rights in the name of public
interest .must be clearly justified or the
limitation will be struck down. 16 As an
example of the length to which courts will
go to protect these freedoms, it has even
been suggested that legislation which impinges upon first amendment freedoms is
presumptively invalid.17 The Court may be
gradually retreating from this preferred
status doctrine,' 8 but it serves to illustrate
the gravity with which infringements on
first amendment freedoms have generally
been viewed.
Various methods and tests have been
devised by the courts to determine whether
a given religious Practice may be validly
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905)'; Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137
N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948).
13 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245
(1934); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437,
:164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); Commonwealth v.
Palms, 141 Pa. Super. 430, 15 A.2d 481 (1940).
4 See, e.g., Jacob Ruppert Corp. v. Coffey, 251
U.S. 264 (1920); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878); Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb.
723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940).
15 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946);
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
16 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639 (1943).
17 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167
(1944); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
140 (1948) (concurring opinion).
Is See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 650
(1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97
(1949) (concurring opinion); Drinker, Some
Observations on the Four Freedoms of the First
Amendment, 37 B.U.L. REV. 1, 29 (1957).
12
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limited by governmental authority.'9 The
most common method of delimiting the
right of religious freedom involves the
"clear and present danger" test. The practice of first amendment freedoms can be
limited under this test only when the practice presents a grave and imminent danger
to public health, safety, or morals.2 "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion . . . as is
necessary to avoid the danger."'
This is the test apparently adopted by
the court in the instant case. The court
recognizes as the paramount interest of
society the necessity of maintaining discipline in penal institutions. There can be
no quarrel with this if it is recognized that
discipline is only a means of achieving
prison security. Prison security, and not
discipline as discipline, would seem to be
the true substantial interest of society.
The court reasoned that to allow the
prisoner to leave the segregation wing to
attend Sunday Mass would present a clear
and present danger to prison discipline.
This conclusion was based solely upon the
statements of prison authorities, parties
with an interest in the proceedings. The
court justified its acceptance of the prison
authorities' conclusions as its own by saying that the courts cannot supervise prison
discipline.
While it did not state what danger to
19See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265
(1934) (concurring opinion). See also In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
20Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
(1943).
21Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951).
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prison discipline or security would be
threatened by the prisoner's release from
the segregation area for attendance at Mass,
it is obvious that the prison officials were
of the opinion that the convict population
might lose fear of segregation if a prisoner
could leavethe wing to attend Mass. Loss
of this fear could in turn result in a general
weakening of discipline with a consequent
weakening of prison security.
Stated thusly, it is apparent that the
"clearness" and "presentness" of the danger
to the paramount interest of society leaves
something to be desired.
The question posed by the instant case,
what are the limits of a prisoner's right to
freedom of religion, cannot be evaded by
holding that he loses such right by necessary implication through the application of
the doctrine of Coffin v. Reichard.22 Such
a holding would be tantamount to converting freedom of religion from a right into
a privilege subject to the sufferance of
prison authorities. Conviction for a crime
would take the place of the due process
required by the fourteenth amendment before religious freedom can be limited. To
support such a view it would be necessary
to maintain that the practice of religion by
a convict necessarily presents a "clear and
present danger" to prison security. This is
patently not so, as is witnessed by statutes
in many states which expressly require that
chaplains be attached to prisons to minister
to the religious needs of the inmates. 23 New
York goes further and explicitly states that
prisoners may not be denied the free practice of their religion.

24

143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945).
23 See, e.g., MASS. LAWS ANN. C. 125, §13 (Supp.
1956); N.Y. CORREC. LAW .§18; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 61, §§346, 378.
24 N.Y. CORREC. LAW §6 10.

The true test must be that adopted by
the court in the instant case. The determinative factor should be the particular
facts of the case; the issue, whether the
particular practice presents a "clear and
present danger" to society by endangering
prison security.
In the instant case the court may be
criticized for accepting the opinions of
prison authorities as conclusive of the matter without some investigation. It involved
itself in a self-contradictory position when
it said it cannot supervise prison discipline.
Once the court took jurisdiction, the conclusion seems inescapable that it should
have itself determined the "clearness" and
"presentness" of, the danger. A federal
court has recognized the contradiction and
2
dismissed a similar complaint. 5
Sunday Laws
In upholding the constitutionality of Sunday legislation against due process, equal
protection, and religious freedom objections, recent cases have pointed up various
factors to be considered by legislatures in
drafting this type of statute.
In Gundaker Central Motors, Incorporated v. Gassert,1 the New Jersey Supreme
Court determined that a statute prohibiting
the sale of automobiles on Sunday was not
violative of the "due process" clause of the
fourteenth amendment since it was a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed
an appeal for want of a substantial federal
question. The New Jersey court said that
the presumed purpose of the legislature in

22

See Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
1 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956), appeal dismissed, 354 U.S. 933 (1957). Followed in Mosko
v. Dunbar, - Colo. -, 309 P.2d 581 (1957).
25

4
enacting the law was to provide a day of
rest for those employed in the automobile
sales business; hence the statute bore a substantial relation to public health, safety, and
welfare. Furthermore, the legislation was
not "violative of the "equal protection" clause
of the fourteenth amendment, since it was
not discriminatory or arbitrary in distinguishing one class of transaction from another. The fiercely competitive .nature of
the automobile sales business encourages a
merchant to remain open seven days a
week, thus tending to deprive employees of
a day of rest. Moreover, a hazard tb heavy
Sunday traffic is created by customers entering and leaving the lots. Therefore, the
state was justified in basing the distinction
on the differences between this and other
merchandising activities.
In a previous issue of THE CATHOLIC
LAWYER, 2 it was pointed out that there are
three types of Sunday laws: those which
prohibit the opening of certain types of
businesses, but permit all others to remain
open; those which prohibit the operation
of all businesses except certain types (which
may, in many instances, sell the same products as do those which are prevented from
opening); and the "commodity" Sunday
laws, which prohibit business activity generally but permit the sale of certain commodities. The statutes dealt with in the
Gundaker case and in Mosko v. Dunbar3
seem to be representative of a "fourth"
type, namely: one which prohibits the sale
of certain commodities, but permits all
other activities; this is the obverse of the
third, "commodity" type.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, in State
v. Ullner,4 considered possible constitu2 See 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 260, 261 (July 1956).
a- Colo. -, 309 P.2d 581 (1957).
4- Ohio App. -, 143 N.E.2d 849 (1957).
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tional objections to Sunday legislation under the religious guarantees of the first
amendment. Since Cantwell v. Connecticut'
had held the first amendment provisions
applicable to the states in 1940, Ohio did
not consider this federal issue, although
other states had ruled such laws were not
prohibited by the first amendment,6 and
Ohio's courts had previously ruled, 7 in accord with states generally," that Sunday
laws were not violative of religious provisions of the Constitution of Ohio.
In the Ullner case, the court used the
same approach as in the previous determination concerning state limitations, pointing
out that such a statute has no bearing on
man's relationship With his God. It neither
establishes a religion nor interferes with the
free practice of religion: "It requires nothing. It imposes nothing. It dictates nothing.
It leaves [man] completely free to choose
his religion and practice it Without let or
hindrance." 9 The general business-closing
law involved in the case was upheld as a
mere provision for a day of rest, which constituted a valid exercise of the state's police
power to legislate for the health and welfare
of citizens.
It would appear, then, that a Sunday law
is most likely to be upheld as constitutional
if it is either the same type as the New Jersey and Colorado laws, or a general closing
law exempting the sale of certain commodi5 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
6 See, e.g., People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75,
96 N.E.2d 184 (1950) (per curiam); cf. McKaig
v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815
(1953).

7 State v. Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N.E. 900
(1898).
SEx parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679 (1861). See,
e.g., Silverberg Bros. v. Douglass, 62 Misc. 340,
114 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
9 State v. Ullner, - Ohio App. -, 143 N.E.2d
849, 851 (1957).
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ties, rather than a statute which distinguishes between businesses. As has been
noted in this publication's previous discussion of Sunday laws, t 0 commodity-type
statutes are unlikely to be held violative of
the "equal protection" clause. If a court
once determines that the legislative purpose in enacting a Sunday law is to provide
a day of rest, the statute cannot thereafter
be successfully attacked as violative of the
"due process" and "freedom of religion"
clauses. However, there is always the danger that a court will not so determine. To
obviate that problem, the legislature can
expressly state the purpose of the law.
Religious Provision in
Corporate Charter
In an application for a charter under
Pennsylvania's Nonprofit Corporation
Law,1 the articles of incorporation stated
that the purpose of the corporation would
be to promote Christianity, and encourage
good will among members of all religious
faiths, "....

with particular emphasis on the

evangelization and conversion of adherents
of the Roman Catholic faith ...."2 In overruling the Court of Common Pleas, 3 the
state Supreme Court held that the charter
should have been granted since such particular emphasis toward members of a specific sect was "lawful and not injurious to
10 See 2

CATHOLIC LAWYER 260, 262 (July 1956).

1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§2851-1 to 1309
(Purdon 1938).
2 Application of Conversion Center, Inc., 388
Pa. 239, 243, 130 A.2d 107, 109 (1957).
3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not review the Court of Common Pleas' decision in
granting or refusing a charter unless there is a
manifest abuse of discretion. In re Independent
Garment Workers' Union, 335 Pa. 209, 6 A.2d
775 (1939).

the community." '4
The first amendment declares that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ."5 The fourteenth
amendment has, in like manner, limited
state legislation.0 This guarantee embraces
to believe, and
two concepts -freedom
freedom to act. 7 The state can in no way
force an individual to accept any religious
code. 8 He may accept, or deny, whatever
mode of worship he so desires. However,
his right of free exercise of religion is not
absolute. 9 One may only practice his religion- his right to worship his God and
preach his tenets - to the extent that it is
not "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."10 To this end, then,
the state may, by general and non-discriminatory legislation, reasonably regulate the
time, the place, and the manner of this
religious activity." While this regulation
may not restrain unduly the communication of religious views, proselytization is,
however, limited by the "clear and present
12
danger" test.
4 PA.

STAT.

ANN.

tit.

15, §2851-201

(Purdon

1938). "Five or more natural persons .... may
form a nonprofit corporation ... for any purpose
or purposes which are lawful and not injurious
to the community." Ibid. (emphasis added.) But

see

PA.

STAT.

ANN.

tit.

15, §2851-4 (Purdon

Supp. 1956) for those organizations which may
not incorporate under these sections.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
7 Id. at 303.
s See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 593-94
(1942).
9 Id. at 594.
10 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878).
1 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
12 Cf. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
633 (1943). This test limiting freedom of
speech first appeared in Schenck v. United States,

4
While the state must remain neutral in
its dealings with religionl3 it may offer
religious 'associations the advantages of
incorporation to assist in the orderly man14
without
agement of their temporalities
interfering with their religious practices.
The state cannot regulate ecclesiastical
affairs, 15 but it may, through non-discriminatory legislation, aid all religions in
attaining their spiritual end by regulating
their material goods and temporal concerns.

16

It should be noted that under Pennsylvania's Nonprofit Corporation Law, the
court has not the authority to consider
anything beyond the statutory requirements
for incorporation.1 7 Hence, when the state
Supreme Court found that "nothing in the
purpose clause ... or in the evidence...
249 U.S. 47 (1919). "The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that ... [the
legislature] has a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
1a Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)
(dictum).
14 See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
249, 253-54 (1815). This case was decided under
a provision of the Virginia Bill of Rights which
also guaranteed all men the right of free exercise
of religion. Ibid. However, the state is not
obliged to grant this privilege. Virginia and West
Virginia deny religious associations the privilege
of incorporation. VA. CONST. art. 4, §59; W. VA.
CONST. art. 6, §47.
15 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952).
16;See Terrett v. Taylor, note 14 supra.
17 In re Deutsch-Amerikanischer
Volksfest-Verein, 200 Pa. 143, 49 At. 949 (1901). ".
[I]f the court shall find the articles to be in
proper form and within the provisions of this
act, and the purpose ... to be lawful and not
injurious to the community, the court shall so
certify on the articles, and shall order and decree
thereon that the articles are approved ... ; otherwise, the court shall refuse the application
for a charter." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2851-207
(Purdon Supp. 1956) (emphasis added).
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indicates that the activities of the corporation would consist of... acts inimical to
the peace, good order or morals of society

. . .",Is

it

concluded

that

the

lower

court's decision should be reversed and
directed that the charter be granted. There
was, however, a strong dissenting opinion.
But if the application had been made in a
jurisdiction which does grant the court the
discretion to consider all the other circumstances concerning the request for incorporation,'
a different result might have
occurred. The sincerity of the applicants
in their proposed attempt to encourage
understanding and good will among members of all religious faiths could well have
been doubted in light of the unnecessary
mention of the Catholic faith. A religious
organization, which is acting in good faith,
does not have any reason to include such
a provision in its charter.
Religious Requirements

for Tax Exemption
California's constitutional provision
granting tax exemptions for property used
for religious worship has been interpreted
to include within its scope the property of
a humanist group. In Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,' plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, brought an action for the
recovery of property taxes and penalties
paid under protest. The District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment
for plaintiff on the ground that, where
activities of a non-profit corporation are
Application of Conversion Center, Ine., 388
Pa. 239, 247, 130 A.2d 107, 111 (1957).
18

19 See, e.g., Application of United Winograder
Medical Center, 125 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct.
1953); In re Boy Explorers of America, 67
N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
1-Cal.

App. 2d-, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
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similar in all respects to those of theistic
religious groups, except for the members'
"lack of belief" in a Supreme Being, the
corporation's property is entitled to a tax
exemption within the meaning of Section
11/ of the California Constitution which
exempts property used for "religious worship."
Phrases similar to the one involved in the
2
instant case, both in the area of exemption
and in other areas, 3 have been consistently
given a traditional interpretation, one necessarily involving the concept of a being
higher than man, a deity.
2 In St. Matthew's Lutheran Church v. Division of
Tax Appeals, 18 N. J.Super.552, 87 A.2d 732, 735
(1952), the phrase "officiating clergyman of any
religious corporation" as contained in,a state
statute was interpreted in this manner: "...
he
must be serving the needs of a reasonably localized
and established congregation. In this sense a congregation signifies an assemblage or union of persons in society to worship their God publicly in
such manner as they deem most acceptable to Him,
at some stated place and at regular intervals."
In Sunday School Bd. v. McCue, 179 Kan. 1,
293 P.2d 234, 236-37 (1956), the construction of
a state constitutional provision was involved
wherein the court said: "We do not believe it necessary to discuss extensively the meaning of the
word 'religious.' It is the adjective form of the
word 'religion' defined by the above dictionary
[Webster's New InternationalDictionary] as being
an apprehension, awareness or conviction of the
existence of a supreme being controlling one's
destiny."
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has made
no attempt at defining the phrase "a church or a
convention or association of churches" as used
therein. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §170(b)(l)(A) (i); cf. id. §511 (a) (2) (A). However, a Regulation was proposed in 1956. See Proposed Treasury Department Definition of Church, 2 CATHOLIc LAWYER 86 (Jan. 1956).

3 In Wiggins v. Young, 206 Ga. 440, 57 S.E.2d

486, 487 (1950), a restrictive covenant against the
use of property "for any business purpose" was
held not to apply to a church for "a church is a
building consecrated to the honor of God and
religion, with its members united in the profession'
of the same Christian faith."

For example, the United States Supreme
Court in construing the language of the first
amendment has said: "The term 'religion'
has reference to one's views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will." '4 Moreover, in the area of draft exemption, a
humanist was denied an exemption under
a provision of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 19405 because ". . . no
matter how pure and admirable his standard
may be, and no matter how devotedly he
adheres to it, his philosophy and morals
and social policy without the concept of
deity cannot be said to be religion in the
sense of that term as it is used in the
statute." This definition was adopted by
Congress in the Universal Military Training
7
and Service Act of. 1948.
In the face of these interpretations the
court, in the instant case, has granted an
exemption to a group lacking any belief in
the supernatural by using a test based on
In Lee v.Poston, 233 N. C. 546, 64 S.E.2d 835,
837 (1951 ), a change of venue was denied because
the defendant was not a "municipal corporation"
under the statute, but rather a religious corporation. The court said: "A religious corporation is
a corporation whose purposes are directly ancillary
to divine worship or religious teaching ......
4 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
5 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, c.720, §5(g), 54 STAT. 889.
6 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
7 62 STAT. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §456(j)
(1952). Special note should be given to the words
of exclusion adopted by the statute: "Religious
training-and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
For treatment of a recent development in the
case law of this area, see 32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
J
105 (1957).

4
activity rather than on belief.8 It has accomplished this result by equating the validity
of a belief with its content. 9 It is true that
a court has no authority to decide the validity of a religious belief, 10 but it is also true
that courts are continually occupied, at
least implicitly, with the religious content
of beliefs," in areas other than that of community law and morals, which the court
2
recognizes as an exception.'
There is certainly a grave difference between the truth or falsity of a religious
belief and the characterization of a belief
as religious. To say that "the content of the
belief is of no moment"' 3 is to render the
word religious void of meaning by immersing within it all possible beliefs. Such an
interpretation, admittedly given to sustain
the constitutionality of the statute,14 seems
rather designed to destroy it on grounds of
vagueness.
8 See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, - Cal. App. 2d -, 315 P.2d 394, 409-10
(1957).
[T]he only valid test a state may
9 Id. at 406. .....
apply in determining the tax exemption is a purely
objective one. Once the validity or content of the
belief is considered, the test becomes subjective
and invalid." Ibid. (emphasis added).
10 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, note 10 supra;
Serra Retreat v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d
755,221 P.2d 59 (1950); Lee v. Poston, 233 N. C.
546, 64 S.E.2d 835 (1951); Philadelphia v. Overbrook Park Congregation, 171 Pa. Super. 581, 91
A.2d 310 (1952).
12 "Of course, the belief cannot violate the laws or
morals of the community, but subject to this limitation, the content of the belief is not a matter of
governmental concern." Fellowship of Humanity
v. County of Alameda, - Cal. App. 2d -, 315 P.2d
394, 406 (1957). Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890), for example, is concerned with bigamous
and polygamous tenets of a religious sect.
13

Id. at 406.

14 "On the other hand, a definition which empha-

sizes the 'non-religious' facets of the conduct of
respondent will serve to sustain the constitutionality of the section." Id. at 409.
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The Supreme Court of California, in deciding whether or not a particular piece
of property came within a related exemption section of the state constitution, 15 used
this test: Was the property ". . incidental
to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of religious or charitable
purposes?"' 6 Thus, where the ultimate proceeds of conducting a home for the aged,
an activity authorized by the plaintiff's
articles of incorporation, were exclusively
used for religious or charitable purposes,
its property was exempted.' 7 Under this
Section Ic, the activity alone is not enough;
a reasonable connection with religious (or
charitable) purposes must be shown before
an exemption will be granted. Under the
court's- interpretation of the Section. 11/
of the State constitution involved in the instant case, activities alone are enough, and
no connection need be made with religion,
for the court, as stated above, has ruled
out any investigation into the religious content of belief. Recognizing the distinction
that Section 1c is concerned primarily with
purposes and that Section 11/2 is concerned
with use,' it is yet submitted that in both
instances religion, given its ordinary and
natural meaning, is the substratum of the
exemption. If religion can be given no definite meaning except one based on activity,
the activities or facilities possibly coming
under Section 1c, which are very similar
to the activities mentioned throughout the
15 CAL. CONST., art. 13, §lc.

16 Serra Retreat v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d
755, 221 P.2d 59, 60 (1950). See also Harrison v.
Guilford County, 218 N. C. 718, 12 S.E.2d 269
(1940).
17 Solheim Lutheran Home v. County of Los
Angeles, 152 A.C.A. 822, 313 P.2d 185 (1957).
But see Sunday School Bd. v. McCue, 179 Kan. 1,
293 P.2d 234 (1956).
18 See Serra Retreat v. Los Angeles County, supra
note 16, at 61.
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present opinion, 9 ought to be sufficient of
themselves to establish an exemption without showing any connection with religious
purpose. Thus, for example, at the present
time a connection with a "religious purpose" would have to be shown before a
lecture hall in which group discussions of
politics, sociology and economics were carried on would be exempt under Section 1c;
the activities or facilities would not suffice.
However, the same lecture hall under the
same conditions would be granted an exemption under Section 11

simply by virtue

of the activities or facilities and without
showing any connection with "religious
worship."'20 The position of the California
courts under these two sections may become inconsistent, unless the courts are
prepared to require a connection with a
concept of religion, now meaningless, under
Section 1c. However, if activities of a
social, political and personal nature are
what constitute religion, then the word
"religious" in.Section Ic would be as anomalous as is its continued use in Section 11/2
under the court's interpretation.
19 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,

Cal. App. 2d -, 315 P.2d 394, 397-98 (1957).
To give a further illustration of how complex
and confused things may become under the court's
interpretation in the instant case, one only has to
refer to a portion of the decision where the court
held that occasional dinners and dances which took
place on the property did not take the property out
of the exemption. Id. at 410. The court here relied
on First Unitarian Soc'y v. Hartford, 66 Conn.
368, 34 Atl. 89 (1895) and quoted with approval
this statement: "The policy on which the exemp-"
tion of church buildings from taxation is granted
is the encouragement of religion; and that policy
is not hindered, but, rather, promoted, by permitting this building to be used for profit when not
needed for those services distinctly called 'religious services'; for literary, scientific, or entertaining exercises, or for any other thing not inappropriate to be had in a church." Id. at 90. The court,
however, does not go on to note what the cited
case considers as "not inappropriate to be had in
20

Insofar as it frustrates the purpose of
the exemption provisions concerned with
religion, the reasoning of the instant case
may lead to the repeal of such provisions.
It is difficult to see how fraternal, social or
political organizations have a pattern of
action inspired by certain moral values developed by religion. The area of the first
amendment and the area of draft exemption would be similarly affected, -as well as
many areas of state procedure. In fact,
an adherence to this omnivorous interpretation of the word "religion" might be the
downfall of all constitutional and statutory
provisions in which it or similar phrases are
employed. A multiplicity of examples is
not necessary to see that such an interpretation is unreasonable and unnecessary. 21 The
word "religion" should be restricted to its
reasonable and natural meaning as developed by decades of case law.
a church," such things as "lectures, concerts, readings ... vocal and instrumental concerts, mesmeric
performances, dramas by amateurs, and, at times,
political conventions." Ibid. These activities bear
a striking resemblance to the activities of the Fellowship of Humanity enumerated in the instant
case. However, to the ordinary observer there
would appear to be a great difference between
activities "not inappropriate to be had in a church"
(the language of the First Unitarian Soc'y case)
and activities which are "analogous to the activities, serve the same place in the lives of its members, and occupy the same place in society, as the
activities of the theistic churches" (the language of
the instant case).
21 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341
(1936) (concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis)
in which the policy of the Supreme Court as to
passing on constitutional questions is expressed,
especially the principle that the Court will not
".... formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied." Id. at 347.
Furthermore, the principle of strict construction
of tax exemption provisions has been grossly violated by the interpretation of the instant case. See,
e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Whitehall Foundation,
135 A.2d 298 (Md. 1957); Church of the Holy
Faith v. State Tax Comm'n, 48 P.2d 777 (1935).
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Professional Disciplining
of Attorneys
Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that persons who willfully
attempt to evade or defeat any tax shall
be guilty of a felony.' The professional discipline problems that arise after the conviction of an attorney'under this section are
illustrated .by two recent disbarment proceedings.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in
2
Kentucky State Bar Association v. Brown,
dismissed a proceeding which was based
solely on the fact of conviction, holding
that a violation of Section 7201 does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude. In State
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Evans, 3 the Supreme
Court of Florida refused to act under a
statute providing for disbarment of attorneys upon their conviction for an infamous crime, and instead suspended the
attorney for a period of two years under
another provision.
Attorneys are expected to maintain a
standard of ethics, reputation and moral
integrity higher than that demanded of
other individuals in the community, concomitant with the status of attorneys as
fiduciaries and as officers of the court. As
a result, many states authorize or require
summary disbarment or other disciplining
of an attorney upon his conviction for certain crimes.
The prerequisite for such summary discipline differs among the states. For example,
New York bases such action on conviction
for any felony;4 Georgia provides for the
removal of an attorney upon his conviction
1 INT.

REV. CODE of 1954, §7201.
2 302 S.W. 2d 834 (Ky. 1957).

94 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1957).
4 N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW §90(4).
3
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for "any crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude," 5 while North Carolina
provides for suspension or disbarment of
an attorney for commission of "a criminal
offense showing professional unfitness." '
One theory advanced as the purpose for
such summary proceedings is the expulsion
from the profession of those who, by their
conduct, have shown that they are unfit to
practice law.'
A conviction of an attorney for murder,
larceny, extortion, embezzlement, perjury or
other similar crimes which require proof of
criminal intent or proof of dishonesty, untrustworthiness or other conduct evidencing an unfitness for practice, would, under
this "unfitness" theory, justify summary
proceedings based solely on the fact of
conviction.
However, if proof of such elements need
not be established for conviction, the "unfitness" theory would not uphold disciplinary
action based solely on the record of conviction. Among the crimes which lack
such elements are involuntary manslaughter, which involves negligence rather than
specific intent, and the malum prohibitum
crimes. In these cases, before any disciplinary action is taken, a strict application
of the "unfitness" theory would require that
a full hearing be held to determine whether
the acts or omissions upon which the conviction is based call for disciplining the
attorney.
. Another theory advanced as the purpose
of this type of summary discipline is that
the practice of law by convicted persons
would cast a serious reflection upon the
dignity and reputation of the entire legal
profession, while summary expulsion or
GA. CODE ANN. §9-501 (1935).
6 N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-28 (1950).
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 42 (1953).
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other punishment will serve to offset the
adverse publicity of such convictions, and
raise the standards of the profession's integrity and self-discipline in the eyes of
the public.8
These motives and purposes merit serious
consideration. However, the application of
the "professional reputation" theory to justify summary disbarment, may result in the
imposition of a harsh penalty. Where summary disbarment is based solely upon a
conviction which does not require evidence
of any act relatable to the competency or
honesty of the attorney, it is submitted that
it would be much more equitable and reasonable merely to suspend the attorney for
the period of his sentence and possibly for
the period of his parole or probation.
A conviction for the crime of willfully
attempting to evade income taxes does not
necessarily involve an intent to defraud 9 or
moral turpitude.' 0 The use of the net
worth, gross expenditure and other analytical methods of establishing available funds
has, for practical purposes, shifted the
burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defendant taxpayer." Once the Government establishes an inference of unreported
income by any of these methods, the defendant is compelled either to come forward with an explanation, or risk convic2
tion.'
The Government, in establishing this inference of unreported net taxable income
by analytical methods, makes no attempt
8 See DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 42; Note,

52 COLUM. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (1952).
9 United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932).
10 In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768
(1954).
11 See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 12429 (1954); Gordon, Income Tax Penalties, 5 TAX
L. REV. 131, 187 (1950).
12 See Schuermann v. United States, 174 F.2d 397
(8th Cir. 1949).

to preclude the possibility that the increase
in net worth or the expenditures of the taxpayer are the result of a past accumulation.
A taxpayer, especially one faced with a
trial several years after the tax year in
question, may be unable to establish, in
proper cases, a past accumulation of savings
or a source of non-taxable income.
Although the Supreme Court has held
that the prosecution must produce proof of
some "evil intent" to warrant a conviction
under Section 7201,13 in many instances
the jury is, in effect, permitted to infer the
required intent from the inference that the
14
defendant had unreported net income.
Therefore, since convictions can be had
without proof of facts showing fraud, dishonesty or other acts reflecting on the integrity or professional ability of an attorney,
summary disbarment should not be based
solely on the fact of conviction under this
section. While a conviction may be justified
for tax purposes, disbarment should be imposed only after a full investigation into the
facts and circumstances of each case and a
finding of bad faith or fraudulent intent.
The courts in the instant cases, and of
other states where disciplinary proceedings
based on tax-evasion convictions have
arisen, 15 appear to have followed this course
of action. In State ex rel. Florida Bar v.
Evans,16 the court refused to act under a
statute providing that "no ...person...
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)
(prosecution under predecessor to §7201).
14 Gordon, supra note 11, at 187.
15 See People ex rel. Dunbar v. Fischer, 132 Colo.
131, 287 P.2d 973 (1955); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So.2d 843
(1944); Rheb v. Bar Ass'n, 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d
289 (1946); In re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297, 217
N.W. 356 (1928); Matter of Crosby, 281 App.
Div. 801, 119 N.Y.S.2d 478 (4th Dep't 1953)
(mem. opinion).
16 94 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1957).
13

4

who has been convicted of an infamous
-17
crime shall be entitled to practice ....
Only after an investigation into the merits
and a finding of misconduct did the court
proceed to suspend the attorney for two
years under a general misconduct provision of the Code of Ethics of the Florida
Bar."
In Kentucky State Bar Association v.
Brown,19 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
refused to disbar the respondent under a
rule which provided for disciplining upon
presentation to the court of a certified
copy of conviction for any felony; 20 the
court held that a conviction under Section
7201 does not involve moral turpitude.
Both courts appear to have taken a just
and reasonable course of action, insofar
as they have refused to disbar solely on the
basis of the record of conviction. However,
in the Brown case, while the respondent
was sentenced to imprisonment for a year
17 FLA. STAT. ANN.
18

§454.18 (1952).

CODE OF ETHICS OF THE FLORIDA BAR,

Canon

32, Rule B.
19 302 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
20
Ky. CT. OF App. RULE 3.335.

THE ELLIS CASE (Continued)
tution of this Commonwealth. With this we
cannot agree. All religions are treated alike.
There is no "subordination" of one sect to
another. No burden is placed upon anyone
for maintenance of any religion. No exercise of religion is required, prevented, or
hampered.

29

It is to be fervently hoped that the Ellis
case has not created any permanent cleavage or division in the community. It is not,
and should not be made, a controversy between Catholic and Jew. It belongs in no
such area. It is to be regretted that the case
29

Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E. 2d at 846.
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and a day, the court did not consider any
type of disciplinary action. As a result, an
imprisoned convict was, in theory at least,
entitled to hold himself out as licensed
and capable of practicing law. In these circumstances, it would appear that discipline
other than disbarment, perhaps suspension
for the period of the attorney's sentence,
should have been considered in order to
preserve the dignity of the profession and
to prevent possible scandal.
This approach, applying both the unfitness and the professional reputation theories of discipline to a limited extent, should
be valid not only in tax evasion cases, but
generally. In the case of a crime which per
se indicates unfitness for practice, where a
hearing as to the factual circumstances
shows that the attorney is unfit, summary
discipline, even disbarment, is not unjust.
In cases that do not involve unfitness, courts
should not feel without authority to impose
discipline less than disbarment, if the
reputation of the profession requires it in
the specific case, and the discipline is such
as not to inflict serious injury upon the
attorney.
ever arose. It would be more regrettable,
however, if one were to refrain from condemning what is patently a brazen defiance
of law, lest offence be taken by the uninformed. The Ellis case with all of its consequent pain to the community has probably
served one useful purpose. If it has done
nothing else, it has virtually assured the
citizens of Massachusetts that there will be
no repetition of this unhappy case. We may
be reasonably sure that in the future the
adoption laws will be rigorously and speedily enforced because, in this area of the
law as in others, justice delayed is justice
denied.

